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Centering the Catholic Church as an actor in the legal construction of sex and sexuality in 
Latin America might seem an anachronism given the recent scandals in which the Church has 
been involved,2 the introduction of clauses establishing the separation of Church and State in 
most Latin American constitutions, and the Church’s own complaints about how it has lost 
influence and ability to inspire devotion among Latin Americans. However, those who have been 
involved in the reform of rules affecting sexual and reproductive rights in the region, and a 
                                                            
1 Profesora Asociada, Facultad de Derecho, Universidad de los Andes; Abogada (con honores), Facultad de 
Derecho, Universidad de los Andes (1996); SJD Harvard Law School (2007)  
2 The Catholic Church has been involved in two major scandals in the last decade. In 2002, and until today, it was 
accused and considered liable for damages sustained by individuals sexually abused by priests in cases in which 
Church authorities knew of the wrongful actions and failed to properly discipline the priests. The sex abuse scandal 
in the US started in February 2002 in Massachusetts with a headline in the Boston Globe accusing Catholic 
authorities of failing to investigate and punish acts of sex abuse by priests (for an overview of the sex abuse scandals 
and the coverage by the Boston Globe see:  http://www.boston.com/globe/spotlight/abuse/overview/ ). The Catholic 
Church not only has had to pay damages amounting to hundreds of millions of dollars, but also has approved a zero 
tolerance policy regarding sexual abuse (approved in the Conference of Bishops held in Dallas in June 2002). The 
most comprehensive report regarding sexual abuse by priests in the United States, known as the John Jay Report 
may be retrieved from the Conference of Bishops webpage: http://www.bishop-
accountability.org/reports/2004_02_27_JohnJay/. A report regarding the region of Fern in Ireland was also 
commissioned and became known as the Fern Report. It may be retrieved from: http://www.bishop-
accountability.org/ferns/. In 2009, a majority of Catholics spoke up against the Vatican’s decision to repeal the 
excommunications of the four Lefrebvian Bishops, including the holocaust denier Richard Williamson. Pope 
Benedict XVI had to write an open letter to the Bishops of the Catholic Church explaining his decision. The letter 
may be retrieved from: http://media.npr.org/documents/2009/mar/pope.pdf. The fact that the Pope had to write this 
letter was interpreted as a clear sign of fragmentation inside the Catholic Church and of the isolation of the Pope 
himself. See http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=101789591. Also, Juan Camilo Maldonado, “El 
timonel de Benedicto” en El Espectador, febrero 6 de 2009 (explaining how the Colombian Cardinal, Darío 
Castrillón, ended up being responsible for the decision) ; “El Papa condena de nuevo el Holocausto y anuncia que 
viajará a Tierra Santa” en Espectador, febrero 12 de 2009; “El Papa explica por qué anuló la excomunión del obispo 
que niega el holocausto” en El Clarín, marzo 11 de 2009 (pointing out how the Pope emphasized in his letter that he 
was hurt by the vehemence of the accusations against him); “Alemanes se suman a críticas contra Benedicto XVI” 
en La República, febrero 4 de 2009; “Merkel critica a Benedicto XVI por caso de obispo Lefrebvista” en El 
Mercurio, febrero 4 de 2009, among many others.   
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considerable number of scholars studying these reforms, have coincided in pointing to the 
Catholic Church as the most important obstacle for achieving greater sex and sexual equality.3  
In this paper I propose that when assessing the role of the Catholic Church in shaping sex 
and sexuality we tend to pay too much attention to how it intervenes to prevent the change of 
repressive legal rules, and too little attention to the way in which law enables the Church’s 
overwhelming presence in the spaces in which sex and sexuality are negotiated daily. And, in 
this sense, that we might be trusting putting too much trust in the mechanism of the 
public/private distinction to handle the impasses we are reaching in achieving greater sex and 
sexuality equality. Firstly because when presenting the possibility of obtaining this goal in terms 
of the liberalization of repressive rules, we foreground the formal aspects of the Catholic Church 
as an institution, and privilege privacy and autonomy as objectives in ways that favor the 
Catholic demand to balance sexual and reproductive rights and other rights. Secondly because 
given the conditions of religious homogeneity and Catholic penetration in the provision of basic 
services, the guarantee of freedom of religion and separation of Church and State only helps to 
further shield Catholic privilege from scrutiny. 
                                                            
3 In this sense, Diego Freedman points out: “the defense of liberalism guarantees a neutral political power in which 
women do not find their individual freedom conditioned by the rules of religious doctrines”. Diego Freedman, 
“Estado laico o Estado liberal” en La Trampa de la Moral Única, Campaña por la Convención de los Derechos 
Sexuales y Reproductivos, Campaña por el 28 de septiembre y Tu Boca es Fundamental contra los 
Fundamentalismos, 2005, pp. 36-55. Also Juan Marco Vaggione: “The Church, without doubts, constitutes the 
greatest obstacle to the liberalization of gender and sexuality in Latin America”. Juan Marco Vaggione, “Entre 
Disidentes y Reactivos: Desandando las fronteras entre lo Secular y lo Religioso” in ibid, pp. 57-75. Julieta Lemaitre 
in an earlier version of the paper submitted for this event has also argued that the Catholic Church has intervened in 
political processes regarding sexual and reproductive rights in many countries in the region and asks “¿How should 
we react before an evident intervention of the Church as an actor with opinions and political participation”. Julieta 
Lemaitre, “La Iglesia Católica es un actor político ilegítimo en materia de sexualidad y reproducción… Respuesta a 
Juan Marco Vaggione” (unpublished manuscript on hold with the author) Also Guillermo Nugent, “El Orden 
Tutelar: para entender el conflicto entre sexualidad y políticas públicas en América Latina” in ibid, pp. 6-36. Mala 
Htun, moreover, has argued that the liberalization of legislation concerning sexual equality and sexual and 
reproductive rights is more strongly related to the role of the Catholic Church than to the characteristics of the 
political systems in the regions in terms of their democratic or non-democratic nature. See Mala Htun, Sex and the 
State: Abortion, Divorce, and the Family under Latin American Dictatorships and Democracies, Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press, 2003.  
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To illustrate these arguments I will use the case of the judicial reform of criminal 
legislation on abortion pursued by the NGO Women’s Link. I will start by proposing how the 
“liberalization” framing that Women’s Link supported, while explicitly geared towards avoiding 
confrontation with Catholic Church authorities, ended up cornering Women’s Link in the need to 
justify the violation to the value of (or right to) life implicated in the voluntary termination of a 
pregnancy according to Catholics, and inviting attacks by a mass of highly sophisticated, 
resourceful, and even dangerous pro-lifers that lacked the public visibility of the Catholic Church 
as an institution and consequently was harder to track down, understand and confront.  
I will then suggest ways in which the imperatives of free will and autonomy that operate 
when considering the regulation of “private” corporations, individuals or practices, have proven 
to be very useful to the Colombian Catholic Church for circumventing the sex and sexual 
democratizing policies and practices that the State promotes. In particular, I will point out how 
clinics and hospitals owned by the Catholic Church have avoided supplying gynecological 
services to women requesting the termination of their pregnancies in situations recognized as 
requiring the liberalization of abortion regulation.  
 
1. Liberalization and the right to life 
In January 2005, the NGO Women’s Link Worldwide set out to reform penal legislation 
on abortion in Colombia through a high impact litigation strategy that it named LAICIA (the 
Spanish acronym for High Impact Litigation for the Unconstitutionality of Abortion in 
Colombia). The project was oriented towards reaching three main objectives: a) liberalizing 
criminal legislation on abortion; b) changing the perception of abortion regulation in public 
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opinion; and, c) teaching local NGO’s strategies for engaging with the judiciary. For this, it 
articulated a legal strategy that included presenting a public action before the Constitutional 
Court demanding the repeal of the articles in the Penal Code that established sanctions for 
women and doctors performing abortions; a network building strategy that involved contacting 
NGOs around the country that had historically been engaged in sexual and reproductive rights 
activism; and a public opinion strategy focused on obtaining support from academics and 
positioning a framing of the issue of abortion that emphasized sexual and reproductive rights and 
sexual health arguments as opposed to moral arguments. 4 
At the heart of the framing strategy was the use of the expression “liberalization,” as 
opposed to the more common “free choice,” “my body for me,” “decriminalization,” or 
“legalization” framings. Mónica Roa, the main spokesperson and mastermind of the project, has 
explained that choosing “liberalization” and not these other framings was important to: a) 
emphasize that the strategy was defending a very moderate stance in the sense that it would 
consider a triumph any change in the criminal legislation reducing the instances or the length of 
sentences; b) emphasize that the moderate stance was warranted in a country like Colombia 
because of its very harsh legislation (“Only 4% of the world’s population lives in countries 
where abortion is completely forbidden. Colombia is one of them” 5); c) avoid the trap of the 
choice-life confrontation, which in the case of the United States had proved to render more 
difficult to obtain greater equality for women through liberalization of abortion laws; and, d) 
avoid engaging the moral confrontation suggested in the traditional framings.6 
                                                            
4 Isabel Cristina Jaramillo Sierra and Tatiana Alfonso Sierra, Mujeres, Cortes y Medios: La reforma judicial del 
aborto, Bogotá, Siglo del Hombre Editores y CIJUS, 2008.  
5 Ibid. 
6 Isabel C. Jaramillo Sierra y Tatiana Alfonso Sierra, op.cit., pp. 15-45.  
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Women’s Link made sure that the strategy was guided by these convictions beyond the 
mere use of the term liberalization. In their legal strategy this was accomplished in four ways. 
First, although the two lawsuits that Women’s Link eventually had to bring before the Court 
included a general demand for the abolition of the criminalization of abortion,7 the substantive 
arguments presented only sustained the subsidiary (in the second case, alternative) claim of 
repealing the criminal prohibition of voluntary interrupting a pregnancy in cases of grave 
endangerment of life and health of the pregnant woman, severe malformations of the fetus or 
pregnancies resulting from rape or non-authorized artificial inseminations. Second, Women’s 
Link made sure that some individuals presented amicus curiae before the Court defending the 
need for more structural changes in the regulation of motherhood.8 Third, Women’s Link 
focused on the existing international law concerning the regulation of abortion in the first 
lawsuit, which implied already that it recognized to have solid ground for a very small change in 
the legislation.9 Fourth, Women’s Link was willing to follow carefully the Constitutional Court’s 
“technical” demands in order to achieve any change in the legislation although there were good 
reasons to contest the Court’s first ruling and to insist on the arguments of the first lawsuit.10  
                                                            
7 Mónica Roa submitted an initial lawsuit before the Court on April 15, 2005. The Court declared that it could not 
decide on the merits of the case because of a technical flaw in the suit. Sentencia de la Corte Constitucional 
colombiana C-1299 de 2005, majority opinion by Álvaro Tafur Galvis, dissenting opinions by Jaime Araújo 
Rentería, and Marco Gerardo Monroy Cabra and Rodrigo Escobar Gil. In the press release issued by the Court on 
December 7, 2005, it explicitly stated that: “The Court admonishes that these [the inhibitory decisions] do not 
prevent citizens from presenting public actions against this article of the penal code in the future.” p. 1. (translation 
by the author) Corte Constitucional colombiana, Comunicado de Prensa sobre las Sentencias relativas al Aborto, 
diciembre 7 de 2005, República de Colombia. Mónica Roa presented a lawsuit following the Court’s 
recommendations on December 15, 2005. The Court decided on the merits of the case in Sentencia de la Corte 
Constitucional colombiana C-355 de 2006, majority opinion by Jaime Araújo Rentería and Clara Inés Vargas, 
dissenting opinion by Marco Gerardo Monroy Cabra and Rodrigo Escobar Gil, concurring opinions by Jaime Araújo 
Rentería and Manuel José Cepeda Espinosa. 
8 Isabel C. Jaramillo Sierra y Tatiana Alfonso Sierra, op.cit. 
9 Ibid 
10 Ibid 
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In the network building strategy the moderate approach also had specific consequences. 
On the one hand, Women’s Link contacted and used the sexual and reproductive rights networks, 
as well as the Colombian feminist network, to find support, but it publicly emphasized that this 
was not a feminist issue and it proactively sought to build bridges with other movements and 
with opinion shapers and elites.11 On the other, Roa explicitly decided to not engage or approach 
in any way radicals in the prolife camp having determined that this would be a waste of time.12 
Finally, in the media strategy, Women’s Link and its media consultants devised a script 
that would be at once clear and persuasive for the general public, and centered on the public 
health and international law dimensions of the strategy. This translated into a set of key messages 
emphasizing Colombia’s international obligations regarding sexual and reproductive rights, the 
relationship between illegal abortions and maternal mortality, and the backwardness of 
Colombia’s excessively harsh legislation.13 In addition, it meant that Mónica Roa, as the main 
spokesperson, was instructed to never engage the moral arguments and never answer directly or 
indirectly questions about the Catholic Church, Catholicism or the right to life. 14 
Notwithstanding the precautions and calculations, Mónica Roa ended up needing State 
appointed bodyguards because of the seriousness of the death threats she received and the attacks 
on her property clearly meant to intimidate her,15 was forced to change the gravitational center of 
her legal claims from equality to dignity, health and life,16 and fell short of persuading the Court 
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abortion and consequently that criminalizing the voluntary interruption of pregnancies is 
generally defensible under the Colombian Constitution. As I already pointed out, I believe that to 
a large extent the strategy partially failed because it unnecessarily focused its strategy on 
repressive rules that the Catholic Church has targeted as needing protection and because it 
expected the Catholic Church to operate through its official channels and not through the 
sometimes dark, sometimes simply not explicitly articulated, maneuvers of affiliates that did not 
openly claim their relationship to the Catholic hierarchy.  
 
a. From equality, to dignity, to the right to life 
In the 14 months that the LAICIA project lasted, Women’s Link had to change its legal 
argument for the liberalization of criminal legislation on abortion from one that centered on the 
right to equality to one that focused on human dignity.17 Even though the Court used some of the 
international and comparative law arguments brought up by the plaintiff, and mentioned for the 
first time the “sexual and reproductive rights of women”, Mónica Roa’s emphasis on 
international law and the shift to human dignity became the stepping stones to reframing abortion 
as an issue involving a confrontation of murderous women and innocent fetuses. In this sense, 
the Court reiterated the discursive strategy of its previous three decisions on abortion18 and 
                                                            
17 Isabel C. Jaramillo Sierra y Tatiana Alfonso Sierra, op.cit. 
18 Sentencias de la Corte Constitucional colombiana C-133 de 1994, majority opinion by Jorge Arango Mejía, 
dissenting opinion by Carlos Gaviria Díaz, Eduardo Cifuentes Muñoz y Alejandro Martínez Caballero; C-013 de 
1997, majority opinión by José Gregorio Hernández, dissenting opinion by Carlos Gaviria Díaz, Eduardo Cifuentes 
Muñoz y Alejandro Martínez Caballero and partial dissent by Jorge Arango Mejía; C-198 de 2002, majority opinion 
by Clara Inés Vargas, dissenting opinion by Marco Gerardo Monroy Cabra, Rodrigo Escobar Gil and Álvaro Tafur 
Galvis.  
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reaffirmed the anti-liberalization choice for the “right to life” by, once again, starting with the 
conflict between the right to life/ value of life and the rights of women.19  
These shifts in framing, as Tatiana Alfonso and I have argued, are not only relevant in the 
distant skies of legal concepts.20 On the one hand, they reveal a patriarchal bias that makes the 
equality argument very difficult to articulate and understand, and which explains the somewhat 
arbitrary stubbornness of the Court when it comes to the legal construction of the constitutional 
issues involved in the regulation of pregnancy.21 On the other hand, they allowed a reassertion of 
the grounds for limiting women’s control over their reproductive decisions.  
Precisely because these shifts in framing were so predictable and led to such a restrictive 
view of the goals and the strategy, this otherwise exceptionally successful litigation22 reminds us 
of the pitfalls of engaging in the reform of repressive rules when it comes to sex and sexuality: 
not only is the repression/licentiousness dualism a preferred trope of Catholics and religious 
zealots in general, but also accusing repressive rules of having particular distributional 
consequences that will be avoided if the prohibition is lifted is a device that can already be 
identified as possessing too many problems.   
In the case of abortion litigation in Colombia, Women’s Link was emphatic in pointing 
out that in Colombia most of the risks to the health and life of women involved in voluntary 
interruption of pregnancies were directly related to the existence of a penal type punishing that 
                                                            
19 The Court explicitly stated: “Such balancing requires identifying and pondering the rights in conflict 
with the duty to protect life, as well as appreciating the constitutional importance of the bearer of such 
rights, in these cases, the pregnant woman.” Sentencia de la Corte Constitucional colombiana C-355 de 
2006, op.cit., num. 7.  
20 See Isabel C. Jaramillo Sierra and Tatiana Alfonso Sierra, op.cit. 
21 We have even tried to identify the set of maneuvers that convince us of the necessity of this type of solution. Ibid. 
22 Ibid  
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conduct as abortion and it was also emphatic in pointing out that any liberalization of the 
legislation would reduce these risks. In addition it highlighted that Colombian legislation had no 
exceptions to punishment for voluntary interruption of abortion and was therefore one of the 
harshest legislations in the whole world.23 These contentions overstate the role of this single rule 
both because they fail to take into consideration the rules on procedure, medical ethics and 
general criminal law that shape the ways in which the rule works, 24 and because they do not 
account for the restrictions under which women negotiate their reproduction generally.25  
In particular, the representation by Women’s Link distorted the cases and reasons for 
illegal abortions to justify moderate reform, and promised a change that has not materialized 
because of, among other things, this distortion: it simply was not true that many women were 
dying for wont of access to abortion in the cases that were legalized.  
 
b. Finding the “Catholics” 
The abortion case also demonstrated that even in the instances in which the Vatican has 
declared to have a particular interest, expecting the Catholic Church to formally appear as an 
institution in public forums in a leadership role of the mobilization against change can be deeply 
misguided.  
                                                            
23 Ibid  
24 Ibid 
25 Ibid 
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In this instance of judicial review of penal legislation concerning abortion, the most 
formal Catholic intervention was an amicus curiae signed by every Colombian Archbishop in 
support of the anti-liberalization position.26  
However, the anti-liberalization or prolife camp mobilized in several ways during the 13 
months that it took to get a decision on the merits of the public action regarding abortion 
legislation and it is certainly possible to trace the relationship of the leaders of these actions to 
the Catholic establishment. In the judicial proceedings, Mónica Roa´s claim for the repeal of 
some articles in the Penal Code was sabotaged, first, by the theft of some pages of the document 
to prevent the formal admission of the claim by the Justice to whom it was originally assigned (J. 
Álvaro Tafur Galvis); second, by requesting the annulment of the decision to admit the petition 
and then appealing the rejections; third, by submitting a lawsuit that was almost identical to 
Roa’s and getting it assigned to the most conservative Justice in the Court; fourth, requesting that 
every progressive Justice step down and not participate in the decision because of their bias in 
favor of liberalization.27 In addition, in the second round, they managed to obtain expert 
testimony of Harvard and Yale professors, psychologists, and medical doctors, as well as the 
signatures of professionals supporting the anti-liberalization position.28  
                                                            
26 Sentencia de la Corte Constitucional colombiana C-355 de 2006, op.cit. The Catholic Church has only intervened 
officially in two other cases before the Court. The Conference of Bishops presented a request to prevent Justices 
Carlos Gaviria Díaz and Antonio Barrera Carbonell from participating in the decision about the annulment of the 
Constitutional Court’s ruling on euthanasia that was denied in the Auto de la Corte Constitucional Colombiana 022 
de 1997. Monsignor Pedro Rubiano, in the name of the Conference of Bishops, gave expert testimony on the 
difference between civil and religious divorce and on the possibility of splitting the civil and religious consequences 
of marriage upon demand by the Court itself. Sentencia de la Corte Constitucional colombiana C-074 de 2004, 
majority opinion by Clara Inés Vargas, dissenting opinions by Marco Garardo Monroy Cabra and Roberto Escobar 
Gil, and by Álvaro Tafur Galvis. 
27 Isabel C. Jaramillo Sierra y Tatiana Alfonso Sierra, op.cit., pp. 56-70.  
28 Ibid, pp. 60-76.  
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Legal strategy for the anti-liberalization camp was coordinated by Aurelio Ignacio 
Cadavid, the individual who presented the petitions before the Constitutional Court, and Ilva 
Myriam Hoyos, who articulated the expert interventions and amicus curiae. Cadavid was 
appointed by John Paul II as a member of the Pontifical Council for the Family and is a member 
of Human Life International and the Latin American Center for the Family.29 Ilva Myriam Hoyos 
has not only served as the Dean of the Law School at the Universidad de la Sabana, owned by 
Opus Dei, but also participates by invitation in events organized by the Vatican.30  
Outside of the legal proceedings, both Catholic Church officials and affluent Catholics 
used their resources and influence to get their anti-liberalization message across. The two most 
visible interventions of the Catholic Church hierarchy were a request made to President Álvaro 
Uribe not to sign the optional protocol to CEDAW because it would force Colombia to liberalize 
abortion legislation, a request that was made public by the media,31 and the excommunications it 
decreed against doctors who agreed to perform abortions in the cases legalized by the 
Constitutional Court, particularly in the case of rape.32 
                                                            
29 See Cadavid’s profile in the web page that was set up for his campaign to the Senate in 2006. He was not elected: 
http://aureliocadavid.com/CMS/index.php?option=content&task=section&id=3&Itemid=28   
30 She was in the Vatican’s official list for the Fifth Conference of Latin American Bishops that met in Brazil in 
2007. See: http://6865.blogcindario.com/2007/04/03122-lista-de-participantes-de-la-v-conferencia-del-episcopado-
latinoamericano-y-del-caribe.html  
31 Isabel C. Jaramillo Sierra y Tatiana Alfonso Sierra, op.cit. 
32 On August 31, 2006, Cardenal Trujillo announced that the doctors that performed an abortion on an 11 year old 
raped by her stepfather had been excommunicated ipso facto because this is one of the cases mentioned by the 
Canon Law Code. See: http://www.aciprensa.com/noticia.php?n=13873. This sanction today is far from being as 
important as it was among Colombians up until 1957, when it could mean becoming fair game for Conservative 
extremists. See Fernán González, Poderes Enfrentados: Iglesia y Estado en Colombia, Bogotá, Cinep, 1997. But it 
still is social important in smaller and traditionally conservative cities and has chilled some of the efforts to 
guarantee that women have access to legal abortions in Colombia. Personal interview with Mónica Roa, March 31, 
2009.  
Isabel C. Jaramillo Sierra 
12 
 
Then again, the largest single expense was the advertisement for the anti-liberalization 
position that José Galat took out in the newspaper with the largest national circulation. José Galat 
also has a very close relationship to the Catholic Church.  
On the ground, Catholics mobilized in three ways. First, teachers at Catholic schools all 
around the country, particularly in the most conservative cities, organized to ask their students to 
write letters to the Constitutional Court explaining that abortion was homicide.33 Second, priests 
were instructed to collect signatures supporting the anti-liberalization position after mass.34 
Third, individuals in the anti-liberalization camp were informed of invitations to proliberalization 
lectures in events organized by the opposition so that they could protest in otherwise academic 
venues.35 
Finally, extremists in the anti-liberalization camp sent Mónica Roa death threats serious 
enough for the government to assign her bodyguards, and ransacked her apartment to steal her 
computer and daily planner.36 It remains unclear who exactly are these extremists as they did not 
identify themselves in any way. 
2. How going private could be enhancing Catholic power 
To begin to understand how Catholic power operates under the conditions of separation 
of Church and state and the guarantee of freedom of religion, it could be useful not only to trace 
the myriad of rules that still explicitly single out Catholicism and give privileges to parishes, 
priests, nuns, convents, the Conference of Bishops and even the Vatican, but also to consider the 
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effect of the structuring concepts of autonomy of the will and freedom of action in enabling the 
Catholic Church and individual Catholics to avoid complying with the guarantee of 
constitutional rights.37  
In Colombia, particularly, notwithstanding the fact that individual citizens can submit 
requests for abstract judicial review of laws and administrative acts before the Constitutional 
Court and the State Council, and in fact have submitted many such requests, there are still some 
laws and regulations that privilege the Catholic Church. Law 119 of 1994, for example, 
establishes that the board of directors of the national institution in charge of technical education 
(SENA) shall include a representative of the Conference of Bishops. Law 434 of 1998, 
furthermore, establishes that the National Council for Peace shall also include a representative of 
the Conference of Bishops. Decree 4313 of 2004 provides that the Colombian State may contract 
missions with the Catholic Church, even if law 115 of 1994 establishes that Indian communities 
should be in charge of providing for the ethno-education of their children. Decree 1175 of 1991 
suspends the Catholic Church’s duty to pay taxes while the Concordat is renegotiated.  
But these, I think, are the easy cases. It is harder to track down, but also to do away with, 
the effects of “moving” religion to the realm of the private. Firstly, because once religion enters 
the realm of the private it gains a sort of invisibility and anonymity that is not characteristic of 
the heavily pressed for transparency realm of the public. Secondly, because the arguments 
attached to the mechanism of the public/private distinction make it very hard to defend particular 
rules for religion and thus reveal the general limitations of the distinction.  
                                                            
37 The idea that separating Church from State might enhance Catholic power rather than taming it was quite 
common among nineteenth century Colombian liberals. For this reason, they favored the model of tuition or control 
of the Church by the State. See, Fernán González, op.cit., and Ricardo Arias, El Episcopado colombiano: 
Intransigencia y Laicidad (1850-2000), Bogotá, CESO, Ediciones Uniandes, ICANH, 2003. 
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The abortion case, again, is useful in illustrating how this works in a concrete instance. In 
this case, it has become clear that enforcing the duty of health care providers to offer legal 
abortions becomes more difficult when the health provider is not a public institution for at least 
two reasons that are of interest to this argument. The first reason is that public inspection and 
supervision of the activities of private health care providers works through the initial process of 
licensing and in response to complaints of users. This means, specifically, that private health care 
providers are not obliged to report their activities and that verifying whether or not they are 
complying, requires the state to invest sizable resources in investigating each health care 
provider.  
The second reason is that users have few incentives to present complaints against private 
health providers because the administrative remedies do not include reparations (only fines 
recoverable by the state and not by the injured party) and because as private persons they are 
judged with more stringent liability rules than the state and by judges who tend to be more pro-
defendant than those who decide cases in which the state is the defendant.  
The private health care providers that are using these loopholes to refuse legally 
permitted abortions, it bears noting, are those that are owned outright or in large part by the 
Catholic Church. The point is that they are not even forced to admit this in order to evade their 
legal obligations.  
 




I have argued in this paper that in the current debate concerning the Catholic Church and 
the protection of sexual and reproductive rights we might have overemphasized the role of legal 
prohibitions in shaping sex and sexuality and establishing power and resources to negotiate them 
while underemphasizing the role of legal privileges and powers that enable the Catholic Church 
to participate in these processes.  
Using the case of the abortion litigation in Colombia I have defended that centering on 
criminal legislation and liberalization as a project not only limits our understanding of the way in 
which legal rules construe motherhood, sexuality and sex equality, but also frames the issue as a 
conflict of rights that demands balancing to respect the rights of all those involved. Balancing in 
the Colombian case meant in the end that only cases in which continuing the pregnancy 
amounted to heroic sacrifice could be recognized as instances of exception for the general rule of 
criminal liability for the interruption of a pregnancy.  
I also sustained that to understand the role of Catholicism in the abortion case it was 
important to keep an eye on the informal ways of putting pressure on the individuals involved in 
the process and on the legal rules and legal arguments that could be rendering these mechanisms 
effective.  
